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TRAJECTORIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY: A MULTI-LEVEL STUDY OF COMPETITION IN FORMULA ONE RACING
The centrality of technological innovation to economic development has meant that it provides an enduring basis for research and debate. Work in this area has developed from the economic principles of the production function (Abramovitz, 1956; Solow, 1957) to consideration of managerial processes (Burns and Stalker, 1961) , and more recently, to connect innovative processes within the firm to the competitive dynamics within industries. Research has focused on the concept of competitive strategy (Porter, 1983; Abernathy and Clark, 1985) , dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997) , institutions (Nelson and Winter, 1977) and coevolution (Levinthal, 1992; Van de Ven and Garud, 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999) . Studies have considered the relationship between incumbents and new entrants (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995) , the relationship between innovators and followers (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) , the distinction between radical and incremental innovation (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Dewar and Dutton, 1986 ) and the implications of competing organizations sharing technologies (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993; Wade, 1995; Cohen et al. 2000) .
All of these are important aspects of competitive dynamics and technological innovation. However, they raise questions about: (1) how evolution differs at relevant levels of analysis (technologies, firms, industries) and (2) how coevolutionary forces within or between these levels affect the survival and dominance of technologies. These questions lie at the heart of the relationship between technological innovation, competitive strategy and firm performance. They are challenging, however, because answering them implies complex theory and a rich set of empirical observations. As one approach to this task, we employ an inductive, theory-building method that draws on archival data and contemporaneous accounts. Using Rosenkopf and Nerkar's (1999) definition of analytical levels and Dosi's (1982) notion of technological trajectory as theoretical lenses, we evaluate technology developments over fifteen years of Formula One racing.
Enfolding theory with data leads to a set of propositions on the evolutionary forces acting on technological trajectories within each level of analysis. The resulting framework informs the relationships between technological transparency, coevolution, and the emergence of dominant designs. Specifically, we argue that when the costs and difficulty associated with transferring component knowledge between firms is low (technological transparency is high), technologies tend to coevolve across firms, leading to complementary technologies and increasing the likelihood of industry dominance. When transparency is low, however, technologies tend to coevolve across functions within firms, leading to competing technologies across firms and increasing the likelihood of a technology's dominance within the firm. Moreover, the data and argument suggests that the forces acting on these two technological trajectories are selfreinforcing, so that as momentum builds behind a trajectory, it becomes more likely that its evolutionary path will end in either firm-or system-level dominance. In the discussion, we trace the implications of the model for theories of competition in technologically intensive environments.
Theoretical Background
In prior research, the role of technology in competition has been studied from at least three levels of analysis, focusing on technology itself (Dewar and Dutton, 1986) , on firms (Teece et al., 1997) or on the industry (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993) . Evolutionary theory is concerned with explanation of processes where there are multiple units (individuals, firms, species, etc.) interacting with an environment (Levinthal, 1992) . Consistent with this perspective, Rosenkopf and Nekar (1999) propose three levels of analysis within which technological evolution can be observed ( Figure 1) . First, at the system level, a community of organizations can be defined.
Here, interactions between firms lead to the development of industry-wide standards and the coordination of products. At this level, the evolution of technology may be influenced by institutional forces (1994) and competitive rivalry (Porter, 1980; . Second, the community of actors within an organization defines the firm level of analysis. At this level, interactions between individuals and sub-units, lead to the integration of technologies to produce products or services (Grant, 1996b) . Technological evolution at this level is likely influenced by the boundedly rational decisions of managers (Levinthal and March, 1981) and by the structure and culture of the hierarchy (Conner and Prahalad, 1996) . At the third level of analysis, componentspecific communities external to the firm can be identified. Within this level, interactions among individuals and groups focus on the development of ideas and lead to the creation of the core knowledge (scientific basis) that forms the foundation of the product (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Murmann, 1998) .
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE Rosenkopf and Nerkar (1999) stress the importance of coevolutionary effects both within and across levels of the hierarchy. This concerns the inter-relationships between change at the component, firm and system levels of analysis. Thus, for example, incremental evolution of technology within the firm may be associated with punctuated evolution at the system level (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 1999) . Coevolution may also be observed within a given level, as when complementary technologies coevolve within firms or systems, for example. This multiple-level, coevolutionary view highlights historically dependent relationships among the experiences that comprise the development of technology in a competitive context.
The meta-level concept of "technological trajectory" (Dosi, 1982) offers a way to conceptualize the flow of such developments. Trajectories describe the path of a moving object across space and time. Technological trajectories, therefore, may be defined as the series of path dependent experiences that track with the evolution of a technology (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . We propose technological trajectories as the thread connecting one experience to another within and across levels of analysis. Building on Dosi (1982) , one can discern three key attributes of such trajectories-their power, momentum and degree of uncertainty.
Power and momentum refer respectively to the degree of influence and impetus behind a trajectory. Among other things, technologies may gain or loose influence and momentum from other technologies, and the relationships between technological trajectories may therefore be described as complementary or competitive (1999) . Complementary trajectories increase the power and momentum of another trajectory while competing trajectories reduce them. A high degree of complementarity between two technologies may even lead to their convergence--where progress in one domain fuses directly with progress in another (Levinthal, 1998) . The result may be acceleration of the constituent technologies, as illustrated by the momentum given to optics and electronics as the result of their convergence in fibre-optics (Kodama, 1992) . In contrast, competing technologies tend to sap one another of power and momentum, because developments in one tend to come at the expense of developments in others. Over time, one trajectory is likely to become dominant, thereby establishing a powerful position, and reducing the power and momentum of alternatives (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) . Consistent with this, Dosi (1982) defines the strength of a trajectory by the number of other technologies that it excludes At the system level, such dominant designs have the effect of stabilizing the technological frontier, as firms accept a particular level of technical and economic performance in order to conform to the industry standard (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998) . Similarly, dominance of a technology within a firm creates organizational inertia as members or sub-units vested in the technology use their centrality to control information and decision-making (Miller and Friesen, 1980) . This effect within firms has also been described as the development of a "paradigm" (Johnson, 1988) , a term originally coined to describe the stability of scientific progress at the component level, i.e. within scientific communities (Kuhn, 1962) . Thus, dominant technological trajectories produce inertial forces at all three levels of analysis, thereby limiting change to incremental developments that are consistent with the dominant design (Christensen and Bower, 1996) .
In addition to power and momentum, uncertainty is the third key attribute of technological trajectories. Early in the life cycle of competing technologies, before much momentum has accumulated behind any one trajectory, there is often no basis for determining which will become dominant (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) . Over time, however, the uncertainties surrounding the course of a trajectory are resolved and future developments become increasingly predictable, predictability being perhaps the most desirable feature of dominant designs.
In sum, the multi-level framework offered by Rosenkopf and Nerkar (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 1999 ) and the concept of technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982) provide a potentially useful way to describe the evolution of technology in a competitive context. This set of lenses suggests reframing questions of technological coevolution as questions about the power, momentum and predictability of technological trajectories. More specifically, it suggests the following questions: What are the sources of power and momentum for technological trajectories? How do these differ within levels of analysis? What are the mechanisms of uncertainty resolution of technological trajectories? How do they differ according to level of analysis? Koza and Lewin (1998) outline how longitudinal case studies provide unique opportunities for empirical and theoretical interpretation. Our approach uses a detailed, historical case study to derive new insights about the above questions. The historical case-based perspective involves matching patterns in the data with theoretical explanations (Yin, 1981) . Studies that focus on multiple technologies, at multiple levels of analysis, over a significant period of time have the advantage of permitting comparisons between, as well as within, technological trajectories in the search for patterns. Fundamentally, however, even a single historical case may be a fruitful source of explanation when it is accompanied by techniques such as theoretical sampling and enfolding appropriate literature (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Some of the best examples of theory development draw on data from only one or a very few cases (Allison, 1971; Burgelman, 1983) .
Methodology
The first and most crucial step in such a design is the selection of the case(s). The principle criterion is the theoretical usefulness of the data for observing relevant phenomena. This "theoretical sampling" approach suggests the need for historical observations from firms competing in a technology-intensive environment. In this instance, we have used longitudinal data of Formula One (F1) racing from 1967-1982 that combines industry, firm and component levels of analysis. In prior work, data from F1 has provided a context for studies that consider the localization of expertise (Pinch and Henry, 1999; Aston and Williams, 1996) and the flow of knowledge between F1 racing and innovation in the motor industry (Foxall et al., 1992) .
Today F1 represents the pinnacle of automotive technology. The circuits used in the championship require cars that are both powerful and maneuverable; the industry has been punctuated by several technical revolutions in engine and car design. The pace and competitiveness of the industry is represented by the fact that no team or driver has won the championship consecutively more than four times over fifty years of competition.
In addition to technological intensity the research questions focus on relationships between technical developments and competitive outcomes. There are many factors that may explain competitive success, including industry and corporate effects (McGahan and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991) , frequently, this makes it difficult to separate out the influence of technology on competition from these other influences. F1 provides an excellent objective measure of competitive performance -winning races. Whilst there are other success criteria that may be affected by technology (such as sales growth, safety record, TV coverage), race performance (represented by the accumulation of championship points in a given year) is unambiguously accepted within the industry as a key competitive outcome. Moreover, data relevant to technological change is regularly reported in light of its effect on winning. Indeed, the history of the industry is permeated with observations about the relationship between technology and competition. Many of these reports include the observers' "theories-in-use" (Weick, 1995) . This mixture of fact and opinion provides a good context to study the phenomena and develop new theory.
Data for the study draws on a large archival database. The data is uniquely rich because F1 is the subject of constant media attention and generates an enormous amount of written material detailing the actual words and actions of industry players--both individuals as well as firms--all of which has been collected in an industry archive located at the in the southern region of the United Kingdom.
1 Published sources of data include periodicals (Autosport, Motor Sport, Racecar Engineering), which provide full race-by-race accounts and detailed descriptions of the "behind the scenes" activity of each team. This data is supplemented other accounts, including autobiographies of the key players to create a detailed chronological database. In order to verify the data, the first author conducted a series of in-depth interviews with the senior managers of the F1 teams included in the study to provide contemporaneous accounts of historical events. A semi-structured scheme was used which asked the individuals to describe critical incidents (Campbell et al., 1970) and account for the performance of the team during the case period.
Assertions made by the interviewee were probed using the 'laddering technique', where statements are explored in terms of their saliency to the individual by using the 'why is that important?' question (Eden and Ackermann, 1998) . This provides observations from individual actors within all three levels of analysis. Some of the data is commentary, but much is objective, and in some cases, quantitative in nature. This multi-layered data is necessary and appropriate for inductive research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1981) .
Study Context
The first This study focuses on a period that begins with the development of the Ford DFV (Double-Four Valve) engine in 1967 and includes the "ground-effect" revolution of the late 1970s that came to an end in 1982. This period has been selected because it includes several technologies, which appear to vary in terms of key factors identified in the analytical framework, i.e. power, momentum and uncertainty.
Case Analysis
The first step in data analysis was to identify technological trajectories. To accomplish this, we divided the data along three historical paths that reflect distinctive technological trajectories: (1) the events leading up to and including the dominance of the Ford DFV engine from 1967 -1973, (2) the experience of Ferrari's unique " Flat-12" engine from 1974-1977, and (3) the activity surrounding the revolution in aerodynamics and the emergence of Williams' dominant "groundeffect" design (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) .
The Ford DFV technology involved the use of a purpose-built, 'V8' configuration that enabled F1 constructors to acquire a highly competitive engine at a relatively low price. The significance of the engine was that it formed a structural element of the car and therefore reduced overall Subsequent inferences in the study are highly sensitive to the definition of technological trajectories. Our choice of the Ford DFV engine, Ferrari Flat-12 and ground-effect trajectories is thus a critical first step in the analysis. In making it, we considered opinions expressed in the archival data and in the interviews with team executives. There was very little disagreement that these three represent key developments during the period, although not everyone agreed about their relative importance. For purposes of expositional clarity, the trajectories are bracketed by distinct sub-periods. Defining them in this way is not meant to suggest their independence, however, and the analysis of the data was seamless in the sense that we did not impose a priori constraints on the time frame for each trajectory. Moreover, given our evolutionary framework, we were especially alert to reports in the data suggesting connections between trajectories. Thus, we recount the case data in three sub-periods and highlight any apparent relationships between developments in one trajectory and those in another.
The Ford DFV Period (1967-1973)
The Ford DFV 'V8'engine was first used competitively in a Lotus 49 at the Dutch Grand Prix in 1967 and caused a sensation by winning its first race. The concept was not just about a better performing engine. Rather, it was about using the engine as part of the car's structure, thus substituting for certain parts of the chassis and creating a lighter and well-powered racecar. The concept of the DFV is illustrated in Figure 3 .
[ The term kit-car refers to the fact that the constructor designed and manufactured the chassis and suspension while the engine and gearbox components were supplied from outside. In this case 'the kit' included the Ford DFV engine, manufactured by Cosworth Engineering, and the gearbox built by Hewland Engineering. In 1969 and 1973 a car with a Ford DFV engine won every Grand Prix, the only occasion in the history of F1 that a single engine totally dominated a season. Figure 2 illustrates its performance.
The Ferrari Renaissance 1974-1977
The availability of the Ford DFV meant that the constructors who were vertically integrated and built their own engines and gearboxes, such as Ferrari and BRM, were at a disadvantage. Their 'in-house' capability appeared to be no longer valid. A merger with Fiat in 1969 provided a huge injection of cash and resources for Ferrari, and this allowed the design and construction of a new larger 12 cylinder engine with the cylinders horizontally opposed, creating a powerful, wide engine with a low center of gravity, referred to as a 'Flat-12'. The configuration of the Flat-12 is contrasted with the V8 in Figure 4 .
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.]
Ferrari had historically seen the engine as the critical aspect of racecar performance:
'Horsepower was everything to Mr. Ferrari and, following his lead, to most of his engineers.
Handling was secondary. Engines to the fore -chassis were regarded merely as brackets to prevent the wheels falling off and to carry the driver and the fuel load.' (Nye, 1998) . The new engine enabled some progress, with a promising performance in 1970, but this was not sustained due to problems with reliability.
However, the huge investment in R&D had included the building of the first purpose-built F1 The renaissance of Ferrari meant that the teams using the Ford DFV were being challenged by a radically different and unique approach to racecar construction. This produced a number of differing responses. In the case of the Brabham team it seemed that the logical response was to move away from the Ford DFV. Lotus also focused on the aerodynamics of the chassis and in 1977 introduced the first 'groundeffect' car, the Lotus 78, an approach that was enormously successful.
"Halfway through that year [1975] it was pretty obvious that a twelve cylinder engine -because
The Ground-Effect Revolution 1978-1982
The original development of aerodynamics in racecars had involved the use of 'wings' or external aerofoils to create downforce which improves grip. In contrast, the ground-effect concept uses the underbody of the car, rather than the upper body or wings, to create a low pressure area, thereby holding the car to the ground and allowing it to travel at far greater speeds when cornering. Two tunnels (or venturi) run along the sides of the car and widen out towards the rear, thereby reducing the pressure and creating a suction effect as the air runs under the car.
The principles of ground-effect are summarized in Figure 5 .
[ INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE.] In 1974 Lotus team owner Colin Chapman asked his Technical Director to take a look at the entire concept of a racecar to see where the performance gains could be made. The Technical Director, along with a specialist aerodynamicist, explored the prospect of producing groundeffect in an F1 car. These two individuals had experimented with these ideas almost ten years earlier when they both worked for BRM. Whilst ground-effect had been developed as a theoretical concept, practical application in F1 was still unresolved. This was achieved by a breakthrough in using 'skirts' -strips down the sides of the car that effectively sealed the area underneath. As with many great discoveries this came almost by accident. The Fan-Car was an attempt to resolve the problem by creating 'artificial' ground-effect using a mechanical fan attached to the rear of the car that sucked the air from underneath. The Brabham BT46B 'fan-car' was a product of this innovative period and won the Swedish Grand Prix in 1978. Ultimately, it was banned because it was deemed to be outside the regulations and because of the alleged danger to drivers from debris being sucked through the fan.
Whilst Brabham were attempting to find ways to achieve ground-effect with a Flat-12 engine, Following the success of the Lotus 78, Colin Chapman sought to move the concept forward with the more complex Lotus 79 and the Lotus 80. In the Lotus 80, the concept was to increase the ground-effect to the extent that the car needed no external wings, but this proved to be less controllable on the track. In an effort to resolve the problem, Chapman and his design team developed a revolutionary twin chassis car, the Lotus 88. The 88 was, however, the subject of protests by all the major teams, and in 1981, the governing body banned the design.
Williams Grand Prix Engineering (WGPE), formed in 1973, was a relatively new, low budget operation. Designer, Patrick Head, imitated the ground-effect concept developed by Lotus, but in a way that was consistent with stringent financial limitations. It proved to be a simple, but highly effective interpretation of the concept. Whilst the Lotus 80 found the limit of applying the ground-effect concept, the Williams FW07 was considered to be the optimal application of the concept to a Formula 1 car.
"..he [Chapman] thought that they [Williams] had made a better quality job of his original concept. I think he felt that the construction of the cars was probably better than ours." (Former Chief Mechanic, Lotus)
Following on from the ground-effect revolution a number of constructors had begun to look at alternative materials to use in the construction of the car. Ground-effect worked most effectively when the car was totally rigid; if there were too much flexing of the chassis then this would destabilize the ground-effect. We have attempted to distill some of the key aspects of the development of this industry during the period 1967-1982. Table 1 summarizes these as they relate to each of three levels of analysis outlined in Figure 1 . 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Competitive Dynamics of Technological Trajectories
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Sources of Power, Momentum and Uncertainty Resolution
All knowledge begins within individuals (Grant, 1996b; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1996) , we therefore begin the description of trajectories at the component level, the world of ideas, where the community's key concern is the development of knowledge. Actors at this level of analysis include, for example, the design team within Cosworth who developed the Ford DFV, Mauro
Forghieri and the design group within Ferrari who produced the Flat-12 engine and the Technical Director and aerodynamicist at Lotus who developed the ground-effect concept. At these early stages, trajectories are relatively uncontaminated by other forms of knowledge or interests. As the aerodynamicist at Lotus suggested, the source of an idea's power at this point is its ability to demonstrate "a better way of doing things." As a concept "proves" itself along these lines, it gains increasing attention and influence within the community. Proof of concept, however, relies on methods and approaches that are grounded in a particular belief system. A trajectory's ability to get started, therefore, may be restrained by its lack of fit with the dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) . Thus, for example, it took nearly a decade for an idea from aerodynamics to be accepted in racecar design. But in Ferrari, the development of the Flat-12 engine was launched directly from the organization's collective belief in engines. In each case, the strength of an idea lies in its ability to solve a particular problem, thereby ruling out alternatives (Dosi, 1982) and focusing activity around a given technical direction.
Proposition 1: Technological trajectories start at the component level as the result of this community's belief in the problem-solving potential of a new idea.
At the firm level, a trajectory appears to gain influence by creating inter-dependencies with component technologies already in place. Adoption of the Ford DFV engine, for example, required radical changes in chassis design to take advantage of its structural features. In Ferrari, "horsepower was everything" (Nye, 1998) , and thus everything was built around the engine, including the chassis design and gearbox. Indeed, the power of Ferrari's commitment to engines, undermined consideration of the ground-effect concept, while Lotus' focus on the chassis provided an ideal environment for the idea to take hold. These and the relative power of one component over others, therefore, seem to be based on the number and strength of interdependencies it creates with other technologies. The concept of inter-dependencies as a source of power within the firm is consistent with knowledge-based theories of the firm wherein hierarchies are seen principally as mechanisms for integrating and applying the knowledge of technical specialists (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996a) . In addition, the number and strength of inter-dependencies has been shown to be a source of influence in studies of intraorganizational power (Hinings et al., 1974) .
Proposition 2: Technological trajectories take hold and gain power within firms by virtue of the number and strength of inter-dependencies they create with other component technologies.
At the system level, the power of a trajectory appears to be related to the level of consensus among firms, and in particular, the degree to which firms agree about the value of a technology to their (individual) success. For example, the Ford DFV engine emerged as the agreed upon design for Lotus, McLaren, Matra and Brabham in less than two years. Similarly, the influence of ground-effect was represented by rapid widespread adoption within the system. Both these technologies became dominant designs at the system level. Ferrari's Flat-12 design, in contrast, gained very little power at the system level with only one other team (Brabham) moving in a similar direction. The difference appears to be the extent that the technologies were perceived as a viable means of improving performance. Importantly, however, these perceptions about what creates success were bounded by higher order norms within the system, so that, for example, trajectories that are outside regulatory norms (like the Brabham fan car) develop very little power at the system level. This explanation resonates with an institutional theorists' explanation of technological evolution wherein adoption is driven by collective belief, social norms and formal regulations (Scott, 1995) .
Proposition 3: The power of a technological trajectory at the system level is rooted in the degree of consensus among key actors within firms about the technology's role in performance, which is influenced and constrained by social norms and regulations.
Momentum develops as the result of additional or reinforcing applications of power. Thus, the theoretical arguments for power contain within them an explanation for how momentum develops at each level (Table 1) . At the component level, momentum is gained by technical achievement. This may be defined within the paradigm then operating or, in rare cases, by a revolutionary approach (Kuhn, 1962) . At the firm level, actors are concerned with more than technical achievement, however, and a trajectory's momentum at this level is accelerated by a belief within the firm that it can achieve a broader range of goals. Thus, critical interdependencies may be created by a technology when it is seen to contribute to survival (Aldrich, 1979) , stakeholder satisfaction (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) , economic profit and other performance-related goals. At the system level, momentum-building processes are similarly grounded in the perceptions of actors, here the consensus about a technology emerges as a legitimation process, wherein links to performance are defined on the basis of observed successes as constrained by formal and informal norms of the community (Scott, 1995) .
Proposition 4: The momentum of technological trajectories is accelerated by perceptions among actors at the component level that the solution contributes to technical achievement, at the firm-level that it contributes to goal achievement and at the system level that it contributes to social legitimacy.
Thus, the momentum created behind the Ford DFV engine at the system level developed as the belief spread that anyone with enough money could go to Cosworth and come away with an engine that was capable of winning races. Ferrari's investments in the Flat-12 engine accelerated as it was seen to be the key to the team's renaissance-not only in technical performance but in rebuilding the team's status and prestige among key stakeholders (owners, sponsors, publics).
Finally, although the ground-effect concept was initially impeded at the component level because it did not fit the paradigm, once the dramatic improvements it made in performance were understood, it spurred a revolution in chassis design within the technical community.
The description of technological trajectories would not be complete without identifying the means that actors use to resolve uncertainties about the trajectory's path. Resolution of such uncertainties becomes important as actors individually or collectively attempt to anticipate the future course of events and shape them in ways that contribute to their perceived self-interest.
These efforts imply a desire to understand and influence the direction and/or velocity of the technology's development. Thus, uncertainty-reducing and decision-making processes within each level can be described in accordance with the explanations of power and momentum.
Consistent with the institutional explanations of consensus at the system level, political processes, including negotiation, bargaining and compromise are the chief means by which actors settle differences and come to a consensus about the role of a particular technology (Scott, 1995) . At the firm-level, technological uncertainties are reduced as boundedly rational actors attempt to make judgments about the means to achieve organizational goals (Simon, 1957) . In sum, technological trajectories are social phenomena, created and sustained by belief within the relevant communities of action. Sociological processes within each community affect their growth, velocity and direction. Good explanations for their development therefore include the sociology of science (Kuhn, 1962) , bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) and institutional mechanisms (Scott, 1995) . This description offers a synthesis of the evolutionary forces affecting technology trajectories at different levels of analysis. By itself, however, it does not add to what we know about how a technology evolves into a position of dominance. Indeed, institutional and competitive influences on this process have been described in prior research (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993) . Nor does the framework address questions about the coevolution of technology. In the next section, however, we suggest an explanation of dominance that, while consistent with prior theory, moves beyond earlier models--tracing the roots of dominance to the nature and coevolution of component technologies. To do so requires animating our discussion by tracing a trajectory's path within and between the levels of analysis.
Tracing the Paths of Technological Trajectories
Power explains the impetus and velocity of technological trajectories, but what governs their direction? Figure 6 suggests that the relative transparency of component knowledge plays a key role in determining the coevolutionary forces that direct a technology's development. The nature of these coevolutionary forces (primarily within or between firms), then, explains whether a technology's path is more likely to end in firm-or system-level dominance.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE Consistent with prior theory (Kogut and Zander, 1992) , we define transparency as the cost and difficulty involved in transferring technology among individuals. Distinct from inimitability (Barney, 1991) , which describes a similar phenomenon between firms, we reserve the concept of transparency to the component level. It is therefore associated with codifiability (Boisot, 1998; Winter, 1987) and the extent to which component knowledge can be easily shared among technical specialists (Wade, 1995) .
As the figure shows, when component technology is transparent, critical knowledge elements are easily shared among technical professionals within firms. Under conditions of competitive rivalry and demand for new products, knowledge diffusion leads to multiple applications of the technology within firms. The technology changes as it is adapted to idiosyncratic firm goals and as it is fused with other path dependent processes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1977; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 1999) . These variations coevolve across rival firms as some applications compete more successfully than others. (Nelson and Winter, 1977; Nonaka, 1994) .
This inimitability may be good for competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) 
Conclusion
In summary we develop two central themes concerning the nature of technological innovation and the evolution of dominant designs. The first is the differences in terms of power, momentum and uncertainty reduction in trajectories at differing levels of analysis.
Clarifying such differences helps us to disaggregate some of the complexity and interdependencies within the innovative process. As a consequence, we are able to present a series of fine-grained propositions concerning the nature of technological evolution. The second is the concept of technological transparency and its role in either generating the complementary technologies necessary for systems level acceptance (dominant design) or building firm level dominance and competitive advantage amongst competing organizations.
The concept of technological transparency also underlines the contrasts between the development of intra-firm proprietary technologies and inter-firm technologies that coevolve at the industry level. The tension between these underlines the importance of a dynamic, multi-level model. Each level of analysis provides a distinctive source of momentum. Firms' seek to achieve their particular goals and develop technologies that provide advantage through superior individual technologies and the synergies created by inter-dependencies across technologies. Component level-communities seek to ensure the dominance of a particular technological solution and the achievement of technological outcomes. In contrast, the system seeks balance and legitimacy in how the technology performs--along political, economic and social dimensions.
The strength and direction of a trajectory evolves across levels of analysis. Trajectories take shape first at the component level (technological trajectory) and may develop later at the systems level (socio-technological trajectory). At the firm level, they are influenced by an architecture of inter-dependent technologies (Henderson and Clark, 1990) . The tensions and contrasts between levels--the need to reconcile technological imperatives with firm level goals and systems level acceptance-create momentum and drive the trajectory's development. Note: The vertical axis represents the relative race performance of a particular technology based on championship points accumulated during the year. Each car is awarded 10 points for a win, six points for second, four points for third and from three to one point from fourth to sixth respectively. 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Performance of Racecar Technologies
Years Points per race versus average
